During a presentation at the recent Evergreen Freedom Foundation Legislative Conference, Robert Rector, Senior Policy Analyst from the Heritage Foundation, noted: One quarter of all U. S. citizens qualify for some form of government assistance--NOT including Medicare or Social Security. He argued that the following seven principles are the only method of truly ending welfare as we know it and eliminating the "toxin" that welfare provides at the taxpayers' expense. (Paraphrased and used with permission.)
Set the right goals - The real goals of welfare reform should be to:
(1) Reduce the welfare caseload; and
(2) Reduce the illegitimacy ratio (the percentage of births which are out-of-wedlock).
Focus on caseload size, not welfare exits - Measuring the number of recipients who leave welfare is misleading and is not a serious goal. Large numbers of "exits" from welfare will occur even when welfare caseloads are rising. States with liberal welfare systems encourage highly employable persons to enroll in welfare; therefore, they soon are able to exit. By contrast, a serious work requirement may actually reduce welfare exits since it will discourage the most employable persons from enrolling in welfare in the first place.
Welfare has a proven negative impact on recipients, especially children. Make eligibility standards tough; actually counsel against entrance to the system: "Do you know what this program will do to you? Do you know what it will do to your children? Is there any way we can help you avoid this decision?"
Work requirements reduce welfare applications - The most important effect of a work requirement is to dramatically reduce the number of persons who apply to obtain welfare. Welfare must become a "work treadmill;" once a person enters the system, work is immediate and continuous. This is called the "dissuasion" effect of work requirements.
Avoid education and training - In spite of claims to the contrary, education and training programs do not increase recipients' wage rates or significantly reduce dependence. By contrast making recipients work (or perform community service) in exchange for benefits will greatly reduce dependence. The best training for a job is a job; as employees learn basic work skills, they move up the ladder of employment opportunity.
Focus work on the most employable recipients first - The initial goal of welfare reform should be to restrict welfare to those who truly need it; eliminate those who do not need welfare but will take a free handout if it is offered. In order to accomplish this goal and to shrink welfare caseloads, work requirements should be focused on the most employable welfare recipients first. These would include two-parent families (10% of caseload) and mothers who do not have preschool children (50% of caseload).
Establish pay-after-performance workfare - Upon applying for welfare, employable recipients should be required to begin a supervised, intensive search for employment. If they have not found a private sector job within six weeks, they should be required to perform community service work. For those performing community service, welfare should be based on pay-after-performance, that is, they will not receive the welfare check until after they have performed the required work. If they fail to perform the required number of hours of community service work, the check must be reduced pro-rata. Pay-after-performance is required by the new federal law.
Put the bureaucracy on performance incentives; don't pay if they don't meet the performance goals - For example, in Wisconsin county welfare offices are required to earn JOBS funds by meeting specific performance criteria. Agencies which fail to meet tough performance standards for caseload reduction are put on notice to meet objectives or be outserviced.
At a March 23, 2005, House Appropriations hearing on a bill to gut the voter-approved I-601 spending limit, Rep. Jim McIntire (D) asked a supporter of I-601’s two-third supermajority requirement for the legislature to raise taxes the following question:
"Can you name a time when we [legislators] have actually not just set it [supermajority requirement] aside by majority vote? I mean, this is in many respects a procedural motion that has no bearing. It’s a statutory constraint that cannot constrain any legislature that chooses as a majority to set it aside . . . have we ever used a supermajority [to raise taxes]?"