Chile leads the way in unemployment reforms (Reprinted with permission from the National Center for Policy
Analysis)
Chile was the first country in the western hemisphere to set up a social
security system, and the first country in the world to reform it using individual
investment accounts. It has again broken new ground by becoming the first
country to use individual accounts in an unemployment insurance (UI) system.
Chile's move should prod the United States to rethink the way it provides
a safety net for unemployed workers.
Chile previously had only a limited system of unemployment assistance.
Some of the unemployed received a very small public benefit$14 to
$30 a monthand a few companies paid severance to displaced workers.
The system now being implemented builds on Chile's success with individually-owned
retirement accounts:
Workers will pay 0.6 percent of their wages into individual accounts,
while employers will pay a 2.4 percent payroll tax divided between individual
accounts and a "joint account."
The accounts will be administered by the same private pension
funds that manage Chilean workers' retirement accounts, and the funds
will invest conservatively in a variety of securities.
The individual account will be in the worker's name and will not
be paid out until the worker becomes unemployed or retires.
Unemployed individuals will be able to draw 30 percent to 50 percent of
their previous wages for up to five months. The joint account will provide
benefits to unemployed people who exhaust the balances in their individual
accounts.
Unlike the U.S. unemployment system, Chileans will be able to draw the
funds out even if they quit or were fired from their last jobs. This will
allow workers more flexibility in changing jobs.
The Chilean approach avoids the need for an adjudication system. In the
United States, benefits often are not paid to workers who quit voluntarily
or are fired "for cause." In one state, for example, the cost
of determining whether a worker's job separation qualified for benefits
and adjudicating the disputed claims adds up to 22 percent of the total
administrative cost.
Chileans with money left in their UI accounts at retirement will roll the
money into their individual social security accounts. This greatly changes
job search incentives. Workers who find jobs more rapidly will build up
a larger retirement nest egg. With the UI account appearing on the same
statement as the social security account, workers will clearly see the connection
between rapid re-employment and retirement funds.
A major problem with the UI system in the United States and other developed
countries is that it gives workers an incentive to remain unemployed. Numerous
academic studies have found that the system leads people to take longer
to find new jobs. The more generous the benefits, the longer the unemployed
take to find new work, on average. The Chilean approach solves this problem.
There is concern in Chile that the additional payroll tax will raise businesses'
costs. However, based on the results of econometric studies conducted in
the United States and Canada, it is likely that Chilean workers will bear
80 percent to 100 percent of the tax burden in the form of lower wages.
The new system in Chile is actually a compulsory saving plan in which workers
finance their own benefits. The U.S. unemployment system is also payroll
tax funded, and it is also a compulsory saving plan, but for workers as
a group rather than individually. Unlike the U.S. system, Chilean workers
will benefit even if they are never unemployed.
Americans may want to consider individual accounts, which have been proposed
by economist Martin Feldstein and by the John Locke Foundation. Other approaches
are also worth considering.
Oregon diverted some unemployment insurance taxes to pay wage subsidies
to companies hiring unemployed workers. The plan focused mostly on low-skilled,
less-experienced workers in need of mentoring and on-the-job training. The
approach has not yet been extended to all of the state's unemployed, although
a universal system is worth considering.
Instead of paying unemployment insurance taxes, government and nonprofit
employers are allowed to self-insure. They simply reimburse the state employment
department for any claims paid. The option of self-insuring unemployment
benefits could be extended to businesses willing to post a bond to guarantee
they will make the reimbursements. (A self-insurance option for workers'
compensation is available to employers in 42 states)
More broadly, the nation should allow the states to experiment with unemployment
insurance reform, as it has with some other programs. The greatest achievements
in welfare reform came not from the 1996 federal welfare reform law, but
from state experiments with alternative welfare systems under waivers from
the federal government. The results from these state experiments strongly
influenced the welfare reform legislation Congress later passed.
States also control the way workers' compensation for work-related injuries
is structured. Many states have improved incentives for workplace safety,
reducing accident rates and employers' costs. States should be granted similar
discretion with respect to the structure of their unemployment insurance
programs.
Our unemployment safety net has changed little since the 1930s, when most
workers were in industrial occupations, most workers were men, and part-time
work was not common. It's time we considered alternatives. It's time we
mirrored Chile's willingness to weave the social safety net in imaginative
new ways.
At a March 23, 2005, House Appropriations hearing on a bill to gut the voter-approved I-601 spending limit, Rep. Jim McIntire (D) asked a supporter of I-601’s two-third supermajority requirement for the legislature to raise taxes the following question:
"Can you name a time when we [legislators] have actually not just set it [supermajority requirement] aside by majority vote? I mean, this is in many respects a procedural motion that has no bearing. It’s a statutory constraint that cannot constrain any legislature that chooses as a majority to set it aside . . . have we ever used a supermajority [to raise taxes]?"