Last week the Washington Education Association (WEA) filed
a lawsuit claiming that the legislatures recent pay raises for beginning
teachers violates the unions collective bargaining rights. However, the
WEAs argument ignores a basic understanding of state law concerning teacher
compensation.
Teachers are able to receive across-the-board cost-of-living-adjustments
(COLAs) or general increases in their base salary only from the legislature
according to current state law. The law forbids school boards from granting
across-the-board base salary increases to teachers (RCW 28A.150.410
and 28A.400.200).
Pursuant to RCW 28A.400.200
(3)(a) The actual average salary paid to teachers cannot exceed the districts
average teacher salary as established by the legislature for the statewide
salary schedule. For grandfathered school districts, this means that their
average actual salary cannot exceed the average as grandfathered, meaning that
unless the legislature changes the base rates (state salary schedule) they
are unable to increase their base salaries for all teachers.
Is this a good idea? We dont think so, but its the law unless
the legislature changes it. And its being manipulated severely right
now.
Districts are able to offer one-year individual contracts which
compensate teachers for extra time, responsibilities, and incentives (TRI).
However, if adopted, these one-year supplemental contracts in no way
bind the state [RCW 28A.400.200(4)
and 28A.400.275].
Unfortunately TRIs have become the source of major contract conflicts between
teachers and school boards. Teacher union officials, realizing they cant
bargain for salary with districts, have been using TRIs to get around the state
salary schedule. This is how it works.
When the legislature did not grant COLAs to all teachers during the last
session (COLAs were granted to teachers in their first seven years), union
officials said they would try to get them at the local level. But legally speaking,
COLAs are part of the base salary, so local school boards are not allowed to
grant them. Instead, to avert threatened strikes, many school boards increase
TRI pay, sometimes to levels exceeding $50 per hour. They do this even when
the necessary funds are unavailable or by finding money through
reducing district financial reserves and/or raiding curriculum budgets and
other academic programs. This forces shortfalls in other areasshortfalls
that districts then come back to the legislature to fill.
Districts that illegally agree to multi-year TRI contracts are promising
funds they may not be able to provide. If a districts funds fluctuate
due to student enrollment, reduction of levy funds, etc, funds to honor the
supplemental contract have to be taken from core academic programs. This is
why supplemental contracts are suppose to be renegotiated each year based on
that years available funding. Renewal of the contract is not required,
but when the money is on the table and in teachers paychecks for one
year, it is expected in succeeding years.
At best this is a snake-oil remedy for districts whose directors are legally
responsible for providing academic quality for students.
The TRI was designed by the legislature to provide funds to school districts
to aim specifically at increasing student achievement. The funds were to be
managed/directed by the district. But in the collective bargaining process,
TRI funds have been used otherwise and are managed mostly by teachers. Legislative
intent has been undermined, and as we saw in Marysville, when district officials
wanted to get back in the drivers seat regarding how teachers intended
to direct usage of the funds, union officials told teachers that the district
was asking them to work without pay. It was a disingenuous charge,
but it worked for the union.
As a result, rather than TRI contracts being used to improve student academic
performance, in some cases, funding them may actually result in education programs
being cut, thus potentially compromising student academic performance.
Using TRI money principally to increase teacher pay is troublesome on several
counts:
Large discrepancies exist from one district to the next in the number of
TRI days and the rate of per diem per day. In some districts, the rate of
pay for TRI is double the rate received by teachers for a day actually worked
in the classroom.
The union currently uses TRI contracts negotiated in one district to force
similar agreements for teacher pay in neighboring districts.
At some point very soon, districts with a low tax base will be unable to
provide the TRI demanded and the stage will be set for another Doran court
decision* due to unequal funding.
We suggest the following considerations as potential solutions:
As long as the legislature keeps the state allocation salary model, they
should make certain COLAs are not funded at the local level. Otherwise, lawsuits
are a certainty. The Auditors office can enforce this provision.
The legislature should clarify the intent of the TRI monies and who will
manage and direct them to achieve legislative intent: the districts
board and administration or the union.
Perhaps the legislature should also consider reminding districts that the
state will not be held responsible for TRI increases that are beyond a districts
revenue capacity.
*Doran 1 (1977) - Judge Robert Dorans decision that the
state was not meeting its duty to fund basic education resulted in the adoption
of the Basic Education Act of 1977; Doran 2 (1983) - Required funding of special-education,
bilingual education, and remediation assistance; Doran 3 (1988) - Addressed
the states funding formula for special-education.
(1) The legislature shall establish for each school year in
the appropriations act a statewide salary allocation schedule, for allocation
purposes only, to be used to distribute funds for basic education certificated
instructional staff salaries under RCW 28A.150.260.
(3)(a) The actual average salary paid to certificated instructional staff
shall not exceed the district's average certificated instructional
staff salary used for the state basic education allocations for that school
year as determined pursuant to RCW 28A.150.410.
(4) Salaries and benefits for certificated instructional staff may exceed
the limitations in subsection (3) of this section only by separate contract
for additional time, additional responsibilities, or incentives. Supplemental
contracts shall not cause the state to incur any present or future
funding obligation. Supplemental contracts shall be subject to the collective
bargaining provisions of chapter 41.59
RCW and the provisions of RCW 28A.405.240,
shall not exceed one year, and if not renewed shall not constitute
adverse change in accordance with RCW 28A.405.300
through 28A.405.380.
No district may enter into a supplemental contract under this subsection for
the provision of services which are a part of the basic education program required
by Article IX, section 3 of the state Constitution.
(1) Any contract for employee benefits executed after April 13, 1990, between
a school district and a benefit provider or employee bargaining unit is
null and void unless it contains an agreement to abide by state laws relating
to school district employee benefits. The term of the contract may
not exceed one year.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to grant employers
or employees the right to reach agreements regarding salary or compensation
increases in excess of those authorized in accordance with
RCW 28A.150.410
and 28A.400.200.
Prepared by Jason Mercier (Budget Research Analyst) and Bob Williams (President)
Contact: Jason
Mercier | Budget Research Analyst | 360.956.3482
At a March 23, 2005, House Appropriations hearing on a bill to gut the voter-approved I-601 spending limit, Rep. Jim McIntire (D) asked a supporter of I-601’s two-third supermajority requirement for the legislature to raise taxes the following question:
"Can you name a time when we [legislators] have actually not just set it [supermajority requirement] aside by majority vote? I mean, this is in many respects a procedural motion that has no bearing. It’s a statutory constraint that cannot constrain any legislature that chooses as a majority to set it aside . . . have we ever used a supermajority [to raise taxes]?"