Determining government's priorities: Lessons
from New Zealand
Though priority-based budgeting is still in its infancy in Washington
state, determining core functions and governing accordingly is a tried-and-proved
practice. Consider New Zealand's success. Facing ongoing budget deficits
and rampant public debt levels, New Zealand decided in 1984 it was time
for meaningful government reform. Budget writers asked a simple question:
"What did we get in public benefits as a result of the expenditure
of money?" Answering this question led to major reforms and resulted
in overwhelming economic success for the country.
Since we are requesting that Washington legislators become actively involved
in setting priorities and making changes necessary to achieve them efficiently
and effectively, we want to offer the following lessons learned from New
Zealand.
Lessons from New Zealand by Maurice P. McTigue Reprinted by permission from IMPRIMIS, the monthly journal
of Hillsdale College (www.hillsdale.edu)
The following is adapted from a February 11, 2004, lecture by Maurice
P. McTigue, former New Zealand Parliament member, ambassador to Canada,
Minister of Employment, Minister of State Owned Enterprises, Minister of
Railways, Minister of Works and Development, Minister of Labor, and Minister
of Immigration.
If we look back through history, growth in government has been a modern
phenomenon. Beginning in the 1850s and lasting until the 1920s or '30s,
the government's share of GDP in most of the world's industrialized economies
was about six percent. From that period onwards and particularly
since the 1950s we've seen a massive explosion in government share
of GDP, in some places as much as 35-45 percent. (In the case of Sweden,
of course, it reached 65 percent, and Sweden nearly self-destructed as a
result. It is now starting to dismantle some of its social programs to remain
economically viable.) Can this situation be halted or even rolled back?
My view, based upon personal experience, is that the answer is "yes."
But it requires high levels of transparency and significant consequences
for bad decisions and these are not easy things to bring about.
What we're seeing around the world at the moment is what I would call a
silent revolution, reflected in a change in how people view government accountability.
The old idea of accountability simply held that government should spend
money in accordance with appropriations. The new accountability is based
on asking, "What did we get in public benefits as a result of the expenditure
of money?" This is a question that has always been asked in business,
but has not been the norm for governments. And those governments today that
are struggling valiantly with this question are showing quite extraordinary
results. This was certainly the basis of the successful reforms in my own
country of New Zealand.
New Zealand's per capita income in the period prior to the late 1950s was
right around number three in the world, behind the United States and Canada.
But by 1984, its per capita income had sunk to 27th in the world, alongside
Portugal and Turkey. Not only that, but our unemployment rate was 11.6 percent,
we'd had 23 successive years of deficits (sometimes ranging as high as 40
percent of GDP), our debt had grown to 65 percent of GDP, and our credit
ratings were continually being downgraded. Government spending was a full
44 percent of GDP, investment capital was exiting in huge quantities, and
government controls and micromanagement were pervasive at every level of
the economy. We had foreign exchange controls that meant I couldn't buy
a subscription to The Economist magazine without the permission of the Minister
of Finance. I couldn't buy shares in a foreign company without surrendering
my citizenship. There were price controls on all goods and services, on
all shops and on all service industries. There were wage controls and wage
freezes. I couldn't pay my employees more or pay them bonuses
if I wanted to. There were import controls on the goods that I could bring
into the country. There were massive levels of subsidies on industries in
order to keep them viable. Young people were leaving in droves.
Spending and Taxes
When a reform government was elected in 1984, it identified three problems:
too much spending, too much taxing and too much government. The question
was how to cut spending and taxes and diminish government's role in the
economy. Well, the first thing you have to do in this situation is to figure
out what you're getting for dollars spent. Towards this end, we implemented
a new policy whereby money wouldn't simply be allocated to government agencies;
instead, there would be a purchase contract with the senior executives of
those agencies that clearly delineated what was expected in return for the
money. Those who headed up government agencies were now chosen on the basis
of a worldwide search and received term contracts five years with
a possible extension of another three years. The only ground for their removal
was non-performance, so a newly-elected government couldn't simply throw
them out as had happened with civil servants under the old system. And of
course, with those kinds of incentives, agency heads like CEOs in
the private sector made certain that the next tier of people had
very clear objectives that they were expected to achieve as well.
The first purchase that we made from every agency was policy advice. That
policy advice was meant to produce a vigorous debate between the government
and the agency heads about how to achieve goals like reducing hunger and
homelessness. This didn't mean, by the way, how government could feed or
house more people that's not important. What's important is the extent
to which hunger and homelessness are actually reduced. In other words, we
made it clear that what's important is not how many people are on welfare,
but how many people get off welfare and into independent living.
As we started to work through this process, we also asked some fundamental
questions of the agencies. The first question was, "What are you doing?"
The second question was, "What should you be doing?" Based on
the answers, we then said, "Eliminate what you shouldn't be doing"
that is, if you are doing something that clearly is not a responsibility
of the government, stop doing it. Then we asked the final question: "Who
should be paying the taxpayer, the user, the consumer, or the industry?"
We asked this because, in many instances, the taxpayers were subsidizing
things that did not benefit them. And if you take the cost of services away
from actual consumers and users, you promote overuse and devalue whatever
it is that you're doing.
When we started this process with the Department of Transportation, it
had 5,600 employees. When we finished, it had 53. When we started with the
Forest Service, it had 17,000 employees. When we finished, it had 17. When
we applied it to the Ministry of Works, it had 28,000 employees. I used
to be Minister of Works, and ended up being the only employee. In the latter
case, most of what the department did was construction and engineering,
and there are plenty of people who can do that without government involvement.
And if you say to me, "But you killed all those jobs!"
well, that's just not true. The government stopped employing people in those
jobs, but the need for the jobs didn't disappear. I visited some of the
forestry workers some months after they'd lost their government jobs, and
they were quite happy. They told me that they were now earning about three
times what they used to earn on top of which, they were surprised
to learn that they could do about 60 percent more than they used to! The
same lesson applies to the other jobs I mentioned.
Some of the things that government was doing simply didn't belong in the
government. So we sold off telecommunications, airlines, irrigation schemes,
computing services, government printing offices, insurance companies, banks,
securities, mortgages, railways, bus services, hotels, shipping lines, agricultural
advisory services, etc. In the main, when we sold those things off, their
productivity went up and the cost of their services went down, translating
into major gains for the economy. Furthermore, we decided that other agencies
should be run as profit-making and tax-paying enterprises by government.
For instance, the air traffic control system was made into a stand-alone
company, given instructions that it had to make an acceptable rate of return
and pay taxes, and told that it couldn't get any investment capital from
its owner (the government). We did that with about 35 agencies. Together,
these used to cost us about one billion dollars per year; now they produced
about one billion dollars per year in revenues and taxes.
We achieved an overall reduction of 66 percent in the size of government,
measured by the number of employees. The government's share of GDP dropped
from 44 to 27 percent. We were now running surpluses, and we established
a policy never to leave dollars on the table: We knew that if we didn't
get rid of this money, some clown would spend it. So we used most of the
surplus to pay off debt, and debt went from 63 percent down to 17 percent
of GDP. We used the remainder of the surplus each year for tax relief. We
reduced income tax rates by half and eliminated incidental taxes. As a result
of these policies, revenue increased by 20 percent. Yes, Ronald Reagan was
right: lower tax rates do produce more revenue.
Subsidies, Education, and Competitiveness
......What about invasive government in the form of subsidies? First, we
need to recognize that the main problem with subsidies is that they make
people dependent; and when you make people dependent, they lose their innovation
and their creativity and become even more dependent.
Let me give you an example: By 1984, New Zealand sheep farming was receiving
about 44 percent of its income from government subsidies. Its major product
was lamb, and lamb in the international marketplace was selling for about
$12.50 (with the government providing another $12.50)per carcass. Well,
we did away with all sheep farming subsidies within one year. And of course
the sheep farmers were unhappy. But once they accepted the fact that the
subsidies weren't coming back, they put together a team of people charged
with figuring out how they could get $30 per lamb carcass. The team reported
back that this would be difficult, but not impossible. It required producing
an entirely different product, processing it in a different way and selling
it in different markets. And within two years, by 1989, they had succeeded
in converting their $12.50 product into something worth $30. By 1991, it
was worth $42; by 1994 it was worth $74; and by 1999 it was worth $115.
In other words, the New Zealand sheep industry went out into the marketplace
and found people who would pay higher prices for its product. You can now
go into the best restaurants in the U.S. and buy New Zealand lamb, and you'll
be paying somewhere between $35 and $60 per pound.
Needless to say, as we took government support away from industry, it was
widely predicted that there would be a massive exodus of people. But that
didn't happen. To give you one example, we lost only about three-quarters
of one percent of the farming enterprises and these were people who
shouldn't have been farming in the first place. In addition, some predicted
a major move towards corporate as opposed to family farming. But we've seen
exactly the reverse. Corporate farming moved out and family farming expanded,
probably because families are prepared to work for less than corporations.
In the end, it was the best thing that possibly could have happened. And
it demonstrated that if you give people no choice but to be creative and
innovative, they will find solutions.
New Zealand had an education system that was failing as well. It was failing
about 30 percent of its children especially those in lower socio-economic
areas. We had put more and more money into education for 20 years, and achieved
worse and worse results.
It cost us twice as much to get a poorer result than we did 20 years previously
with much less money. So we decided to rethink what we were doing here as
well. The first thing we did was to identify where the dollars were going
that we were pouring into education. We hired international consultants
(because we didn't trust our own departments to do it), and they reported
that for every dollar we were spending on education, 70 cents was being
swallowed up by administration. Once we heard this, we immediately eliminated
all of the Boards of Education in the country. Every single school came
under the control of a board of trustees elected by the parents of the children
at that school, and by nobody else. We gave schools a block of money based
on the number of students that went to them, with no strings attached. At
the same time, we told the parents that they had an absolute right to choose
where their children would go to school. It is absolutely obnoxious to me
that anybody would tell parents that they must send their children to a
bad school. We converted 4,500 schools to this new system all on the same
day.
But we went even further: We made it possible for privately owned schools
to be funded in exactly the same way as publicly owned schools, giving parents
the ability to spend their education dollars wherever they chose. Again,
everybody predicted that there would be a major exodus of students from
the public to the private schools, because the private schools showed an
academic advantage of 14 to 15 percent. It didn't happen, however, because
the differential between schools disappeared in about 18-24 months. Why?
Because all of a sudden teachers realized that if they lost their students,
they would lose their funding; and if they lost their funding, they would
lose their jobs. Eighty-five percent of our students went to public schools
at the beginning of this process. That fell to only about 84 percent over
the first year or so of our reforms. But three years later, 87 percent of
the students were going to public schools. More importantly, we moved from
being about 14 or 15 percent below our international peers to being about
14 or 15 percent above our international peers in terms of educational attainment.
Now consider taxation and competitiveness: What many in the public sector
today fail to recognize is that the challenge of competitiveness is worldwide.
Capital and labor can move so freely and rapidly from place to place that
the only way to stop business from leaving is to make certain that your
business climate is better than anybody else's. Along these lines, there
was a very interesting circumstance in Ireland just two years ago. The European
Union, led by France, was highly critical of Irish tax policy particularly
on corporations because the Irish had reduced their tax on corporations
from 48 percent to 12 percent and business was flooding into Ireland. The
European Union wanted to impose a penalty on Ireland in the form of a 17
percent corporate tax hike to bring them into line with other European countries.
Needless to say, the Irish didn't buy that. The European community responded
by saying that what the Irish were doing was unfair and uncompetitive. The
Irish Minister of Finance agreed: He pointed out that Ireland was charging
corporations 12 percent, while charging its citizens only 10 percent. So
Ireland reduced the tax rate to 10 percent for corporations as well. There's
another one the French lost!
When we in New Zealand looked at our revenue gathering process, we found
the system extremely complicated in a way that distorted business as well
as private decisions. So we asked ourselves some questions: Was our tax
system concerned with collecting revenue? Was it concerned with collecting
revenue and also delivering social services? Or was it concerned with collecting
revenue, delivering social services and changing behavior, all three? We
decided that the social services and behavioral components didn't have any
place in a rational system of taxation. So we resolved that we would have
only two mechanisms for gathering revenue a tax on income and a tax
on consumption and that we would simplify those mechanisms and lower
the rates as much as we possibly could. We lowered the high income tax rate
from 66 to 33 percent, and set that flat rate for high-income earners. In
addition, we brought the low end down from 38 to 19 percent, which became
the flat rate for low-income earners. We then set a consumption tax rate
of 10 percent and eliminated all other taxes capital gains taxes,
property taxes, etc. We carefully designed this system to produce exactly
the same revenue as we were getting before and presented it to the public
as a zero sum game. But what actually happened was that we received 20 percent
more revenue than before. Why? We hadn't allowed for the increase in voluntary
compliance. If tax rates are low, taxpayers won't employ high priced lawyers
and accountants to find loopholes. Indeed, every country that I've looked
at in the world that has dramatically simplified and lowered its tax rates
has ended up with more revenue, not less.
What about regulations? The regulatory power is customarily delegated to
non-elected officials who then constrain the people's liberties with little
or no accountability. These regulations are extremely difficult to eliminate
once they are in place. But we found a way: We simply rewrote the statutes
on which they were based. For instance, we rewrote the environmental laws,
transforming them into the Resource Management Act reducing a law
that was 25 inches thick to 348 pages. We rewrote the tax code, all of the
farm acts, and the occupational safety and health acts. To do this, we brought
our brightest brains together and told them to pretend that there was no
pre-existing law and that they should create for us the best possible environment
for industry to thrive. We then marketed it in terms of what it would save
in taxes. These new laws, in effect, repealed the old, which meant that
all existing regulations died the whole lot, every single one.
Thinking Differently About Government
What I have been discussing is really just a new way of thinking about government.
Let me tell you how we solved our deer problem: Our country had no large
indigenous animals until the English imported deer for hunting. These deer
proceeded to escape into the wild and become obnoxious pests. We then spent
120 years trying to eliminate them, until one day someone suggested that
we just let people farm them. So we told the farming community that they
could catch and farm the deer, as long as they would keep them inside eight-foot
high fences. And we haven't spent a dollar on deer eradication from that
day onwards. Not one. And New Zealand now supplies 40 percent of the world
market in venison. By applying simple common sense, we turned a liability
into an asset.
Let me share with you one last story: The Department of Transportation
came to us one day and said they needed to increase the fees for driver's
licenses. When we asked why, they said that the cost of relicensing wasn't
being fully recovered at the current fee levels. Then we asked why we should
be doing this sort of thing at all. The transportation people clearly thought
that was a very stupid question: Everybody needs a driver's license, they
said. I then pointed out that I received mine when I was fifteen and asked
them: "What is it about relicensing that in any way tests driver competency?"
We gave them ten days to think this over. At one point they suggested to
us that the police need driver's licenses for identification purposes. We
responded that this was the purpose of an identity card, not a driver's
license. Finally they admitted that they could think of no good reason for
what they were doing so we abolished the whole process! Now a driver's
license is good until a person is 74 years old, after which he must get
an annual medical test to ensure he is still competent to drive. So not
only did we not need new fees, we abolished a whole department. That's what
I mean by thinking differently.
There are some great things happening along these lines in the United States
today. You might not know it, but back in 1993 Congress passed a law called
the Government Performance and Results Act. This law orders government departments
to identify in a strategic plan what it is that they intend to achieve,
and to report each year what they actually did achieve in terms of public
benefits. Following on this, two years ago President Bush brought to the
table something called the President's Management Agenda, which sifts through
the information in these reports and decides how to respond. These mechanisms
are promising if they are used properly. Consider this: There are currently
178 federal programs designed to help people get back to work. They cost
$8.4 billion, and 2.4 million people are employed as a result of them. But
if we took the most effective three programs out of those 178 and put the
$8.4 billion into them alone, the result would likely be that 14.7 million
people would find jobs. The status quo costs America over 11 million jobs.
The kind of new thinking I am talking about would build into the system
a consequence for the administrator who is responsible for this failure
of sound stewardship of taxpayer dollars. It is in this direction that the
government needs to move.
Maurice P. McTigue is a distinguished visiting scholar at the Mercatus
Center at George Mason University, where he directs the government accountability
project. He also sits on the Performance Management Advisory Committee for
the Commonwealth of Virginia. Previously, he was a member of the New Zealand
Parliament and New Zealand's ambassador to Canada, and was closely involved
in New Zealand's deregulation of labor markets, deregulation of the transportation
industry, and restructuring of the fishing industry through the creation
of conservation incentives. He also served as New Zealand's Minister of
Employment, Minister of State Owned Enterprises, Minister of Railways, Minister
of Works and Development, Minister of Labor, and Minister of Immigration.
The Evergreen Freedom Foundation is a non-profit public policy research
organization dedicated to preserving and advancing individual liberty, free
enterprise and limited and accountable government.
Contact: Jason Mercier | Budget
Research Analyst | 360.956.3482
At a March 23, 2005, House Appropriations hearing on a bill to gut the voter-approved I-601 spending limit, Rep. Jim McIntire (D) asked a supporter of I-601’s two-third supermajority requirement for the legislature to raise taxes the following question:
"Can you name a time when we [legislators] have actually not just set it [supermajority requirement] aside by majority vote? I mean, this is in many respects a procedural motion that has no bearing. It’s a statutory constraint that cannot constrain any legislature that chooses as a majority to set it aside . . . have we ever used a supermajority [to raise taxes]?"