Judge's order regarding EFF public records
requests
"All current and future public disclosure requests and
related communications regarding the 7E7 project and Master Agreement from
Plaintiff [EFF] and Plaintiffs representatives must be transmitted
through Plaintiffs counsel to Defendants counsel [The Office
of the Attorney General] for review for consistency, to provide an opportunity
for clarification, to reduce the multiplicity and duplicative requests,
and to alleviate the substantial and irreparable damage to vital government
functions and impact on limited staff resources for the responding agency.
This process applies to Defendants Department of Community, Trade and Economic
Development, the 7E7 Project Office, and the Office of the Governor. For
new public records requests, the Defendants time period to respond
under RCW 42.17 begins after this review process is completed and on the
date that the Defendant agency receives the request."
RCW 42.17.251
The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies
that serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their
public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know
and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed
so that they may maintain control over the instruments that they have created.
The public records subdivision of this chapter shall be liberally construed
and its exemptions narrowly construed to promote this public policy.
[1992 c 139 § 2.]
Legislative intent
NOTES:
Intent -- 1987 c 403: "The legislature intends to restore the law
relating to the release of public records largely to that which existed
prior to the Washington Supreme Court decision in "In Re Rosier,"
105 Wn.2d 606 (1986). The intent of this legislation is to make clear that:
(1) Absent statutory provisions to the contrary, agencies possessing records
should in responding to requests for disclosure not make any distinctions
in releasing or not releasing records based upon the identity of the person
or agency which requested the records, and (2) agencies having public records
should rely only upon statutory exemptions or prohibitions for refusal to
provide public records. Further, to avoid unnecessary confusion, "privacy"
as used in RCW 42.17.255 is intended to have the same meaning as the definition
given that word by the Supreme Court in "Hearst v. Hoppe," 90
Wn.2d 123, 135 (1978)." [1987 c 403 § 1.]
At a March 23, 2005, House Appropriations hearing on a bill to gut the voter-approved I-601 spending limit, Rep. Jim McIntire (D) asked a supporter of I-601’s two-third supermajority requirement for the legislature to raise taxes the following question:
"Can you name a time when we [legislators] have actually not just set it [supermajority requirement] aside by majority vote? I mean, this is in many respects a procedural motion that has no bearing. It’s a statutory constraint that cannot constrain any legislature that chooses as a majority to set it aside . . . have we ever used a supermajority [to raise taxes]?"